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ABSTRACT 
 
With many countries considering the adoption of a system of earned income tax credits, it 
is useful to analyze how different types of credits affect labor supply and earnings. This 
paper focuses on a 1999 reform to the UK tax credit system, which increased the value of 
the credit and reduced the phase-out rate. Using panel data, with individual fixed effects, 
I compare eligibles and ineligibles within five groups: all individuals; those whose 
demographic characteristics predict that they will have low earnings; single women; 
women in couples; and men in couples. Over a 15-month period, boosting the credit 
appears to have raised the labor participation rates, hours, and earnings of those who were 
eligible to receive it.  
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 1. Introduction
During recent years, earned income tax credits have been introduced, or 
expanded, in a variety of developed nations. Focused on boosting labor supply and 
“making work pay”, earned income tax credits are a form of work subsidy, available to 
low-wage workers. Frequently, another goal of earned income tax credits is to improve 
the welfare of children, and they are therefore typically more generous for working 
parents than working singles.  
A notable difference between the earned income tax credits that have been 
implemented concerns the “phase-in” range. While the Belgian, Dutch, Finnish, and US 
credits have a range in which the value of the credit increases with earnings, the British 
and Irish programs become fully available at a certain threshold (Gradus 2001).1 Without 
a “phase-in” range, theory predicts that the effect on labor force participation for singles 
who are out of the labor force should be unambiguously positive, the effect on labor force 
participation for secondary earners who are out of the labor force should be 
unambiguously negative, and the effect on hours for those already in the labor force and 
earning over the threshold should be unambiguously negative.  
Although several studies have shown that the US EITC boosts labor supply, 
evidence on the UK tax credit is more limited. This paper therefore considers the impact 
of the UK credit on labor supply and earnings, exploiting a 1999 increase in the credit as 
a natural experiment. In contrast to most EITC studies, which have used cross-sectional 
data, I make use of a fifteen-month panel dataset, making it possible to hold constant 
individual-specific factors, and identify the policy impact by comparing changes in the 
treatment group with changes in the control group. 
To presage the results, I find increases in labor force participation, average hours 
and earnings for workers who are eligible for the tax credit, and a reduction in the 
probability that those eligible for the credit will say that they have a serious health 
problem. These results are robust to a range of different treatment and control groups; 
and do not appear to be driven by other policy changes that occurred in 1999 and 2000. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some 
background on the UK tax credit and briefly discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 
presents the empirical strategy and results. Section 4 provides robustness checks, and the 
final section discusses the results and concludes. 
                                                 
1 The UK credit is also boosted by a small amount if the recipient works 30 hours or more. 
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 2. Model and Background
Since 1971, Britain has had some form of means-tested benefit for adults with 
children who worked more than a certain number of hours per week (Dilnot and McCrae 
1999). This has variously been known as the Family Income Supplement (1971-88), the 
Family Credit (1988-99), the Working Families Tax Credit (1999-2003) and, most 
recently, the Working Tax Credit. Due to the ever-changing nomenclature of the 
program, this paper will simply refer to it as the “UK tax credit”.  
British tax credits differ from the US EITC in five major respects. First, as has 
been mentioned above, the UK credit has no phase-in range. The credit is unavailable to 
those working below 16 hours, and fully available to those working 16 hours or more, 
with a small additional credit amount available to those who work 30 hours or more. 
Second, the phase-out range is substantially steeper (the effective marginal tax rates in 
the phase-out range after the 1999 reform was at least 55 percent; higher than the top 
marginal tax rate in the UK at the time). Third, while the US has made a small EITC 
payment available to childless workers since 1994, UK tax credits were only extended to 
those without children in 2003.2 In 1999-2000, the years that this paper focuses on, UK 
tax credits were unavailable to childless adults – furthermore, the UK tax credit system 
also provided a generous childcare tax credit. Fourth, while over 99 percent of US EITC 
recipients obtain their credit at the end of the tax year (US Treasury 2003), UK recipients 
chiefly obtain the credit through their pay packet, with the amount based on their 
earnings over the previous three months. Indeed, since April 2000 many recipients – and 
most lone parents – have been paid the credit in this manner.3 And fifth, the levels of 
welfare in the UK are on a par with the value of the tax credit. For example, after the 
October 1999 reforms, a single woman with two children under 10 would have been 
entitled to income support of £101.20 if she worked less than 16 hours per week; or a tax 
credit of £92.00 if she worked 16 hours or more, but earned below £90 (working would 
also entitle her to a 70 percent rebate on childcare costs). Because the timing of the 
increase in welfare coincided perfectly with the increase in the tax credit, it is likely that 
                                                 
2 For more detail on the 2003 tax credit reforms, see Brewer (2003). 
3 Since April 2000, the only exceptions to the rule that the credit must be paid through the employee’s pay 
packet are for applicants who are not employed (the credit continues to be paid out for some time after 
termination of employment), for the self-employed, and in situations where the non-working partner in a 
couple claimed the credit. The latter is the most important exception, since the majority of couples had the 
credit paid to the non-working partner. See 
http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/manuals/acgmanual/Introduction/acg00020.htm 
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any estimates in this paper will be an underestimate of what would have occurred if the 
tax credit were increased, but welfare remained constant. 
Figure 1 presents a stylized representation of the budget constraint under the 
British and US tax credit systems, for the case of a minimum wage worker. The jagged 
piece of the budget constraint for the British tax credit reflects the fact that, although low-
wage employees get a basic tax credit at 16 hours and an additional amount at 30 hours; 
the 16-hour credit has already begun to phase out before the 30-hour credit becomes 
available. In general, minimum wage employees in the UK are eligible for an 
approximately equal tax credit amount if they work 16 hours or 30 hours (though this 
also varies according to the number of children). Overall, the UK tax credit is more 
targeted than the US EITC, but has an immediate phase-in, only a short flat area, and a 
rapid phase-out.4  
 
With US  
tax credit 
With British  
tax credit 
After-tax incom
e 
Figure 1: Stylized depiction of the Budget Constraint Under the 
British and US tax Credit Systems 
Hours/Pre-tax income 
→ Leisure 
← Work 
 
                                                 
4 Even after the April 2003 reforms to the UK tax credit, the phase-out rate is 37%, considerably higher 
than the phase-out rates for the US EITC (7.65% for workers without children, 15.98% for workers with 
one child, and 21.06% for workers with two or more children). 
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The change which this paper will focus upon is a significant increase in the credit, which 
took place on October 5, 1999. The new tax credit was more generous than its 
predecessor in five main respects (Blundell et al 2000):5
• it increased the basic credit from £48.80 to £52.30 per week; 
• it increased the per-child credit for children under 11 from £14.85 to £19.85 per 
week; 
• it increased the threshold before earnings began to taper off from £80.65 to £90 
per week;  
• it reduced the taper rate from 70 percent to 55 percent;6 and 
• it included a childcare credit of 70 percent of actual childcare costs up to £150 per 
week. 
Additionally, at the same time as Britain increased the tax credit, it also boosted out-of-
work benefits for families with one or more children aged under 11. Since the timing was 
coincident with the increase in the tax credit, this paper will not attempt to disentangle the 
two reforms. However, it is worth noting that the labor force participation effect that 
might be expected to occur from boosting in-work benefits alone is larger than the labor 
force participation effect one might expect given an increase in both in-work and out-of-
work benefits.  
As administrative data show, the October 1999 changes prompted a substantial 
increase in the number of tax credit recipients and the average credit amount (Inland 
Revenue 2003). Figure 2 shows the number of tax credit recipients, while Figure 3 shows 
the average credit amount. In both graphs, the shaded region denotes the duration of the 
panel that will be used to analyze the changes. Over this fifteen-month period (March 
1999 to May 2000), the number of tax credit recipients rose by 29 percent (from 821,300 
to 1,061,400), while the average credit amount rose by 16 percent (from £62.99 to 
£73.28). However, while there was no discernible increase in takeup rates between when 
                                                 
5 The October 1999 reform also shifted the administration of the tax credit from the Benefits Agency to 
Inland Revenue. 
6 The taper rate for the UK tax credit applied to earnings after income tax and payroll tax (known in the UK 
as the national insurance contribution) had been deducted. For a worker in the phase-out range whose 
annual earnings were below the lower earnings limit for both payroll and income taxes ($3432 per year in 
1999-2000) the effective marginal tax rate was simply the taper rate (70% before October 5, 1999, 55% 
thereafter). For this worker, the reduction in the effective marginal tax rate would simply have been 15% 
(70%-55%). But for a worker in the phase out range who was subject to the 10% payroll tax and income 
taxes, the effective marginal tax rate in 1999-2000 would have been {(0.1+income tax rate)+(1-0.1-income 
tax rate)*taper rate}. Where these other taxes applied, the reduction in the effective marginal tax rate 
arising from the 15% reduction in the taper rate would have been somewhat less than 15%. For example, if 
the individual’s marginal income tax rate was 10%, the reduction would have been 12% (76%-64%). 
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after the credit increase was announced in the March 1998 budget statement and when it 
was implemented in October 1999, this does not necessarily mean that there was no 
anticipation effect, since the March 1998 announcement might nonetheless have had 
some impact on labor supply. 
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Figure 2: Number of Tax Credit Claimants 
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Figure 3: Average Weekly Tax Credit 
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What effect should we expect these changes to have on labor supply? Bearing in 
mind the differences between the UK and US EITCs that have been discussed above, one 
possible answer is to consider evidence from changes in the US EITC. Eissa and 
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Liebman (1996) use a differences-in-differences approach to analyze the 1987 increase in 
the US EITC, and find that it led to a 2.8 percentage point increase in the relative 
participation rates of single women with children, but had no effect on the hours of those 
already in the labor force. Meyer (2002) charts changes in labor force participation over 
the period 1986-2000, and concludes similarly that the credit boosted labor supply on the 
participation margin, but had no significant effect on the hours margins for low-wage 
workers. Meyer looks at a variety of demographic groups, but concludes that the EITC 
primarily affected single women. Exploring whether this effect was due to the EITC or to 
welfare reform, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) model the impact of both tax and welfare 
changes, and conclude that most of the increase in labor force participation was due to tax 
changes. 
Several US studies suggest that the EITC may lower labor force participation for 
secondary earners, in circumstances where one adult is already working. This could be 
due either to the income effect (which would apply to all recipient households), or to the 
substitution effect (which would apply to households in the phase-out range). Analyzing 
the negative income tax experiments of the 1970s, Hausman (1985) concludes the income 
effect was significant, and could lead to a decrease in labor supply. Comparing labor 
force participation of low-skill and high-skill married women, Ellwood (2000) finds that 
EITC expansions over the period 1986-99 reduced the labor supply of married women in 
EITC-eligible families by between 3 and 7 percentage points. And comparing low-skill 
married couples with children to low-skill childless couples over the period 1984-96, 
Eissa and Hoynes (2004) conclude that boosting the EITC reduced wives’ labor supply 
by 1 percentage point, which they attribute primarily to the income effect.  
What is the effect on net welfare of raising the EITC? Leigh (2004) finds that 
increases in the EITC are associated with a fall in pre-tax hourly wages for low-skilled 
workers – since an increase in labor supply drives down the equilibrium wage. Given the 
apparent finding that labor supply rises and wages fall, what is the net impact on well-
being of an EITC increase? Using variation from US state EITCs, Neumark and Wascher 
(2001) find that states which introduce or increase an EITC raise the income-to-needs 
ratio for poor families. Similarly in Canada, Michalopoulos, Robins and Card (2005) 
study a randomly assigned EITC experiment, and conclude that the program had a strong 
positive effect on both employment and earnings. Yet because the UK tax credit could 
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potentially lower the equilibrium wage for low-skilled workers, it will be important to 
analyze its impact not only on labor supply, but also on earnings.7
Evidence on UK tax credits is more limited, but rapidly burgeoning. Using 
structural modeling, Blundell et al (2000), Gregg et al (1999), and Paull et al (2000) 
predict that the 1999 reform should lead to a 1½-2½ percentage point increase in the 
employment rate of single mothers, while Blundell et al (2000) and Gregg et al (1999) 
predict that the labor force participation rates for married women should fall.8 More 
recent work by Brewer et al (2003) uses data from the Family Resources Survey to 
simulate the effects of the changes that occurred between April 1999 and April 2000. 
They conclude that the total effect of these reforms was to boost the employment of 
single mothers by 3.4 percentage points, but reduce the employment of men and women 
in couples by 0.4 percentage point. Their simulations also indicate that the reforms 
should have increased the hours of working single mothers by 0.6 hours per week, 
increased the hours of married women by 0.3 hours per week, and reduced the hours of 
married men by 0.2 hours per week. 
Two natural experiment-type studies have focused on the effect that the suite of 
policy reforms implemented during the 1990s and early-2000s had on single mothers. 
Gregg and Harkness (2003) take single mothers as their treatment group, and childless 
single women as their main control group. Using the UK Labour Force Survey (and the 
General Household Survey before that) as a repeated cross-section, and with propensity 
score matching to balance the treatment and control groups on observable characteristics, 
they conclude that the policy reforms implemented over the period 1998-2002 boosted 
the employment rates of single parents by 5 percentage points, and increased average 
hours per week of those already in employment by 1.2 hours. And in a study produced 
contemporaneously with this one, Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2004) use the 
British Household Panel Survey, finding that the reforms to the UK tax credit between 
1991 and 2001 boosted the fraction of single women with children who worked in excess 
of 16 hours per week by 7 percentage points.  
                                                 
7 Note that this is still an imperfect measurement of the effect of the policy change on earnings, since if 
workers eligible for the credit and workers ineligible for the credit work in the same occupations, then an 
EITC-induced increase in labor supply will drive down the hourly wage for both eligibles and ineligibles. 
In this instance, comparing the gross weekly earnings of eligibles and ineligibles might lead the researcher 
to overestimate of the impact of the policy on the welfare of eligibles (and ignore the detrimental effect on 
ineligibles). 
8 For a careful comparison of these three studies, see Blundell and Reed (2000). 
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This study presents a straightforward natural experiment, focusing on only the 
1999 tax credit reform. It differs from existing studies in that it focuses on a variety of 
treatment and control groups, and analyzes a broad range of outcomes, including labor 
force participation, the probability of working each number of hours from 1 to 50, total 
earnings, and the probability that an individual will admit to having a health problem that 
affects employment. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy and Results
In order to analyze the impact of the WFTC, I use data from a special five-quarter 
longitudinal sample of the Quarterly Labour Force Survey.9 The LFS is a survey similar 
in nature to the US Current Population Survey, though with a somewhat smaller sample 
size.10 A strategy akin to differences-in-differences is employed, comparing outcomes in 
the two quarterly surveys before the change (March to August 1999) with outcomes in 
the two quarterly surveys after the change (December to May 2000). However, unlike a 
standard differences-in-differences approach, I take advantage of the panel structure of 
the data to include an individual fixed effect term, so the results are identified only from 
changes in individuals’ behavior, not from shifts in the composition of the sample. Since 
the tax credit increase occurred in October 1999, the survey conducted from September to 
November 1999 is omitted from the analysis. All respondents in the five-quarter 
longitudinal dataset were first observed in the March 1999 quarter. In total, 98.9 percent 
also answered the survey in the last quarter (May 2000), and 96.7 percent answered the 
survey in all four of the quarters used in this study (March 1999, August 1999, December 
2000 and May 2000). Non-response bias is addressed through the use of longitudinal 
weights (for more detail on the methodology used to create these weights, see Clarke and 
Tate 1999; Office of National Statistics 2003). 
Five treatment-control pairings are identified: 
• parents vs. childless adults; 
• parents with predicted earnings below the median vs. childless adults with 
predicted earnings below the median; 
                                                 
9 The dataset is filed in the UK Data Archive as Study Number 4303 (2nd edition, May 2003). 
10 The sample is further reduced for earnings questions, since these are asked in only Wave 1 and Wave 5, 
and in such a manner that the respondent has the opportunity to opt out of this part of the survey. Although 
this could potentially bias estimates of the impact of the October 1999 tax credit reform on earnings, the 
extent of this bias is limited through the inclusion of individual fixed effects. 
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• single mothers vs. single women without children;11 
• non-single mothers vs. non-single women without children; and 
• non-single fathers vs. non-single men without children. 
In each case, the sample is restricted to prime age adults (those aged 25-59) who 
are not self-employed. Children are defined as dependent children aged under 16, or aged 
16-18 and in full-time education (the survey question correspondents to the eligibility 
requirements for the tax credit). Since tax credit rules treat married and de facto couples 
in a similar manner, I group both together – rather than separating married and unmarried 
parents, as is more typical with US studies.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics from Wave 1 for those without children (the 
control group in the first specification) and with children (treatment group). Those with 
children tend to be younger than their childless counterparts, and to work slightly fewer 
hours (conditional on being employed), but the employment rates, gross weekly incomes 
and net weekly incomes of the two groups are otherwise quite similar. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics – Full Sample 
 Without children (control) With children (treatment)
 Mean SD Number of 
individuals 
Mean SD Number of 
individuals 
Male 0.509 0.500 4086 0.443 0.497 3863 
Age 43.697 10.971 4086 37.664 7.378 3863 
Black 0.014 0.116 4086 0.030 0.170 3863 
Asian 0.018 0.132 4086 0.038 0.191 3863 
Other non-white 0.003 0.059 4086 0.008 0.089 3863 
Education (years) 11.486 1.974 4086 11.444 1.954 3863 
Non-single 0.660 0.474 4086 0.850 0.357 3863 
No. of children 0 0 4086 1.866 0.902 3863 
Employed 0.745 0.436 4086 0.740 0.439 3863 
Weekly hours in all jobs 35.480 16.353 3008 33.261 17.462 2923 
Weekly earnings  
(pre-tax) 
350.519 227.374 2454 340.122 266.817 2485 
Weekly earnings  
(post-tax) 
258.453 153.983 2420 250.774 178.569 2455 
Health problem 0.311 0.463 4082 0.207 0.405 3860 
Health problem limits 
work 
0.202 0.402 4086 0.114 0.318 3863 
 
The basic regression model is to estimate the following equation: 
 
iti
erAfterOctob
t
erAfterOctob
t
nHasChildre
iit IIIOutcome εχγβα ++++= 19991999*  (1) 
 
                                                 
11 Single fathers are not analyzed, since they comprise such a small slice of the population (just one-tenth of 
single parents living with dependent children in the UK are fathers).  
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Where dummy variables denote whether the person is observed after October 
1999 and whether he or she has children in the first wave, and χi is an individual-specific 
fixed effect. Since the dummy variable for having children does not change within a 
person, it is not necessary to include it separately, since it is absorbed in the person fixed 
effect.12 Standard errors are clustered at the person level, to take account of serial 
correlation across waves. “Outcome” is one of a variety of continuous and binary 
outcomes to be estimated.  
In the case of continuous outcomes, I use a fixed effects OLS specification. 
Where the outcome is binary, the two possible estimation methods are a fixed effects 
logit model, and a fixed effects OLS model (since fixed effects probit and tobit are both 
known to be biased). I opt here for the latter, though the results are not qualitatively 
different when the former is used instead. Note that since this is a person fixed effects 
specification, the impact of the reform on hours and earnings is estimated only for those 
who were in the workforce both before and after October 1999. Appendix 1 compares the 
results from this fixed effects specification with two alternative models – a simple 
differences-in-differences estimator, and a matched differences-in-differences estimator – 
and finds similar results for the outcomes of hours worked and gross income. 
Table 2 presents the results from the first regression specification, using all 
parents as the treatment group, and adults without children as the control group. Making 
the tax credit more generous appears to have led to a 1 percent rise in the relative 
employment rate of those in the treatment group, a 1.3 hour rise in average weekly hours, 
a 2.5 percent relative rise in the probability that those in the treatment group would work 
16 hours or more per week, and a 3.1 percent relative rise in the probability of working 
30 hours or more per week. Relative to the control group, gross earnings rose by 4.6 
percent, while net earnings by 3.3 percent. For the full sample, an increase in the tax 
credit had a negative (though not significant) effect on the extent to which an individual 
was likely to report a health problem, or to say that that problem limited the kind of work 
he or she could do. This suggests that self-reported health may perhaps be endogenous to 
the economic opportunities provided to individuals. 
 
                                                 
12 A small number of respondents changed eligibility status between the before and after period – eg. 
because they had their first child, or because their children passed the age threshold for eligibility. I code 
these individuals as remaining in the control group (or treatment group) throughout the 15-month period. 
Alternatively, one might include both a “has children” variable and individual fixed effects. Doing so 
makes no substantive difference to the results. 
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Table 2: Full sample 
Treatment group: Parents 
Control group: Childless adults 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Employed Total 
weekly 
hours 
>16 
hours 
>30 
hours 
Log  
(pre-tax 
earnings) 
Log 
(post-tax 
earnings) 
Health 
problem 
Limiting 
health 
problem 
Treat*After 0.009* 1.284*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.046*** 0.033*** -0.006 -0.007 
 [0.005] [0.387] [0.009] [0.010] [0.012] [0.011] [0.005] [0.006] 
After  -0.008** -1.266*** -0.008 -0.028*** 0.004 0.01 0.009** 0.017*** 
 [0.003] [0.270] [0.006] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004] 
Indiv. FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 31600 23874 23874 23874 10247 10247 31600 31600 
R2 0.90 0.57 0.69 0.74 0.95 0.95 0.87 0.86 
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors, 
clustered at the individual level, in parentheses. Specifications including work hours are restricted to those 
in employment. Earnings are combined weekly earnings from main job and any secondary job. Post-tax 
earnings take into account income taxes and tax credits. “Treat” denotes individuals in the treatment group, 
while “After” denotes observations after October 1999. 
 
In Table 2, the only hours of work specifications tested are the probability of 
working 16 hours or more and the probability of working 30 hours or more. To gain a 
fuller picture across the hours distribution, I test the effect of the reform on the 
probability of working each number of hours from 1 to 50. Unlike Table 2, I now code 
those who do not work as having zero hours. The results of this specification are shown 
in Figure 4, along with dashed lines denoting the 90 percent confidence interval for the 
estimates. This suggests that the 1999 reform had a positive effect on hours worked at all 
points in the hours distribution. Interestingly, significant hours effects are observed for 
the higher part of the distribution (even up to 40 hours per week), above the point at 
which the 30-hour tax credit becomes available. Indeed, I find no evidence of bunching in 
the estimated policy effect at either the 16-hour threshold or the 30-hour threshold. This 
would be consistent a model in which workers have control over their labor force 
participation, but not over their precise weekly hours. 
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Figure 4: Employment participation gap between treatment and 
control groups, for various numbers of hours 
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Note: Estimates show the effect of the tax credit reform on the probability that the individual will 
work a given number of hours or more.
 
Next, I confine the sample to those most likely to be affected by the reform. 
Choosing only those with low earnings would be to select on the dependent variable. So 
instead, I first run a regression of log weekly earnings in the March 1999 quarter (prior to 
the tax credit reform) on a set of demographic characteristics which would not have been 
affected by the reform: sex, age, age2, race dummies, education dummies, plus 
interactions between education and age, and between education and sex. Using this, I 
then predict each person’s earnings, and restrict the sample to those whose earnings are in 
the lower half of the predicted earnings distribution. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the predicted poor without children 
(control group for this specification) and with children (treatment group), as measured in 
Wave 1. Those with children tend to be younger than their childless counterparts, less 
likely to be in employment (by a margin of 7 percentage points), likely to work fewer 
hours (conditional on being employed), and to have lower gross and net weekly earnings. 
On gender and education, the two groups are quite similar. Overall, while the two groups 
are reasonably alike, the gap in labor market outcomes between the treatment and control 
groups is more sizeable for the predicted poor than it was for the full sample. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics – Predicted Poor 
 Without children (control) With children (treatment)
 Mean SD Number of 
individuals 
Mean SD Number of 
individuals 
Male 0.106 0.308 2036 0.096 0.295 2000 
Age 44.356 11.326 2036 35.676 7.176 2000 
Black 0.012 0.110 2036 0.037 0.189 2000 
Asian 0.021 0.144 2036 0.049 0.215 2000 
Other non-white 0.004 0.061 2036 0.008 0.089 2000 
Education (years) 10.628 1.395 2036 10.517 1.181 2000 
Non-single 0.682 0.466 2036 0.755 0.430 2000 
No. of children 0 0 2036 1.874 0.940 2000 
Employed 0.697 0.460 2036 0.622 0.485 2000 
Weekly hours in all jobs 31.415 15.395 1405 25.463 15.612 1299 
Weekly earnings  
(pre-tax) 244.578 153.193 1141 197.533 161.133 1125 
Weekly earnings  
(post-tax) 186.411 105.244 1126 154.771 106.848 1114 
Health problem 0.337 0.473 2032 0.207 0.405 1998 
Health problem limits 
work 0.222 0.415 2036 0.125 0.331 2000 
 
Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (1), but with the sample 
restricted to the predicted poor. Among this group, the effect of the reform is 
approximately the same as for the full sample, though somewhat less precisely estimated. 
For those with sub-median predicted earnings, the 1999 tax credit reform boosted relative 
employment rates, hours, and earnings for the treatment group. As might be expected, the 
magnitude of the effect on hours and earnings seems to be larger for the predicted poor 
than in the full sample. 
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Table 4: Predicted Poor 
Treatment group: Parents with predicted earnings below the median 
Control group: Childless adults with predicted earnings below the median 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Employed Total 
weekly 
hours 
>16 
hours 
>30 
hours 
Log  
(pre-tax 
earnings) 
Log 
(post-tax 
earnings) 
Health 
problem 
Limiting 
health 
problem 
Treat*After 0.014* 1.572*** 0.032** 0.023 0.056*** 0.064*** -0.009 -0.013 
 [0.008] [0.512] [0.015] [0.015] [0.018] [0.017] [0.008] [0.008] 
After  -0.011** -1.112*** -0.004 -0.019* -0.003 -0.003 0.010* 0.022*** 
 [0.005] [0.369] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.006] [0.006] 
Indiv. FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 16108 10947 10947 10947 4740 4693 16108 16108 
R2 0.9 0.62 0.72 0.77 0.95 0.95 0.88 0.86 
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors, 
clustered at the individual level, in parentheses. Specifications including work hours are restricted to those 
in employment. Earnings are combined weekly earnings from main job and any secondary job. Post-tax 
earnings take into account income taxes and tax credits. “Treat” denotes individuals in the treatment group, 
while “After” denotes observations after October 1999. Sample is restricted to those whose predicted 
individual earnings in Wave 1 (based on a regression of earnings on sex, age, age2, race dummies, 
education dummies, interactions between education and age, and interactions between education and sex) 
are below the median in the sample (£245 per week).  
 
Table 5 shows results for the last three specifications – single women, non-single 
women, and non-single men. While the standard errors are higher – in some cases making 
them statistically indistinguishable from zero – the point estimates are quite similar 
across the three groups. Together, these findings suggest that the 1999 reform boosted the 
employment probabilities, hours, and weekly earnings for single women, and for both 
partners within couples.  
The positive impact of the reform on the labor force participation and hours of 
non-single women (Panel B) may at first blush appear difficult to reconcile with the 
findings of natural experiment-style studies on the US EITC (Ellwood 2000; Eissa and 
Hoynes 2004), and structural studies of the effect of the 1999 reforms to the UK tax 
credit (Brewer et al 2003). The most likely answer is that the reduction in the taper rate 
and the higher childcare tax credit had a sufficiently large positive effect on the hours of 
non-single women that it offset any negative effect on labor supply of increasing the 
maximum credit amount. In a context where secondary earners already face high 
marginal tax rates, it should not be surprising that a reform of this type can improve work 
incentives for partnered mothers as well as for single mothers. In the case of non-single 
men, the effects are mostly insignificant, with a positive effect on gross earnings, but not 
on net earnings, and a positive effect on the probability of working more than 30 hours 
that is only significant at the 10 percent level. However, the results in Panel C do indicate 
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that the reform did not have a negative effect on the labor force participation of non-
single men. 
 
Table 5: Different Family Types 
Panel A 
Treatment group: Single mothers 
Control group: Single women without children 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Employed Total 
weekly 
hours 
>16 
hours 
>30 
hours 
Log  
(pre-tax 
earnings) 
Log 
(post-tax 
earnings) 
Health 
problem 
Limiting 
health 
problem 
Treat*After 0.006 1.731 0.002 0.043 0.022 0.049 -0.006 -0.013 
 [0.015] [1.101] [0.032] [0.033] [0.045] [0.037] [0.015] [0.016] 
After  -0.01 -1.244* 0.011 -0.022 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.015 
 [0.008] [0.719] [0.020] [0.021] [0.017] [0.015] [0.010] [0.012] 
Indiv. FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4223 2682 2682 2682 1163 1157 223 223 
R2 0.91 0.53 0.67 0.74 0.95 0.96 0.88 0.87 
Panel B 
Treatment group: Non-single mothers 
Control group: Non-single women without children  
 Employed Total 
weekly 
hours 
>16 
hours 
>30 
hours 
Log  
(pre-tax 
earnings) 
Log 
(post-tax 
earnings) 
Health 
problem 
Limiting 
health 
problem 
Treat*After 0.016* 1.746*** 0.045*** 0.036** 0.077*** 0.075*** -0.01 -0.016* 
 [0.008] [0.543] [0.017] [0.016] [0.019] [0.017] [0.008] [0.009] 
After  -0.011** -0.890** -0.004 -0.025** -0.008 0 0.017*** 0.029*** 
 [0.006] [0.414] [0.012] [0.012] [0.015] [0.012] [0.006] [0.007] 
Indiv. FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 13317 9536 9536 9536 8196 8196 13317 13317 
R2 0.89 0.59 0.71 0.77 0.95 0.95 0.86 0.85 
Panel C 
Treatment group: Non-single fathers 
Control group: Non-single men without children 
 Employed Total 
weekly 
hours 
>16 
hours 
>30 
hours 
Log  
(pre-tax 
earnings) 
Log 
(post-tax 
earnings) 
Health 
problem 
Limiting 
health 
problem 
Treat*After 0.006 0.718 0.017 0.029* 0.046** 0.01 -0.002 -0.007 
 [0.008] [0.657] [0.013] [0.015] [0.019] [0.017] [0.008] [0.010] 
After  -0.01 -1.265*** -0.014 -0.031*** -0.003 0.009 0.004 0.016** 
 [0.006] [0.485] [0.010] [0.012] [0.015] [0.012] [0.006] [0.007] 
Indiv. FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 11092 9550 9550 9550 4041 3988 11092 11092 
R2 0.89 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.91 0.9 0.85 0.85 
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors, 
clustered at the individual level, in parentheses. Specifications including work hours are restricted to those 
in employment. Earnings are combined weekly earnings from main job and any secondary job. Post-tax 
earnings take into account income taxes and tax credits. “Treat” denotes individuals in the treatment group, 
while “After” denotes observations after October 1999. 
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4. Robustness Checks
The years 1999 and 2000 were busy ones for social policy reformers in the UK 
government. In addition to boosting the tax credit in October 1999, Britain introduced a 
national minimum wage on 13 April 1999, reduced the bottom tax rate on 6 April 2000, 
and made various changes to the National Insurance Contribution Scheme on 6 April 
1999 and 6 April 2000. Might these have biased the results observed above?  
One simple answer is to say that, given that both the treatment and control groups 
had similar weekly earnings at the outset, these other policy changes might have affected 
γ (the coefficient on the “After October 1999” indicator variable), but should not have 
affected the coefficient of interest, β (the coefficient on the interaction between the “After 
October 1999” indicator variable and the indicator variable for having children). 
Another approach is to gauge the potential bias from studies focusing on these 
other reforms. In the case of the minimum wage, there is evidence to suggest that the bias 
was pretty insignificant. The group most likely to earn the minimum wage are young 
workers, and those aged under 25 were excluded from the foregoing regression results. 
Moreover, in an analysis of the effect of the minimum wage, Stewart (2004) looks at both 
adults and youths, and finds no adverse employment effects from its introduction. 
Concentrating at aged care homes, Machin and Wilson (2004) find a modest negative 
impact on employment.  
A more parsimonious way of testing whether the results were affected by these 
policy reforms is to restrict the sample. Dickens & Manning (2002) find that virtually all 
the effects of the minimum wage increase had taken place within two months of its 
introduction. Therefore, by excluding surveys taken before the rise (March 1999), and in 
the subsequent two months (April and May 1999), it should be possible to essentially 
purge the results of any “minimum wage effect”.  
The tax and national insurance changes were more complex, but as with the 
minimum wage, it is difficult to see prima facie why they ought to have had a differential 
effect upon the treatment and control groups. Adam and Reed (2003) provide a detailed 
account of the national insurance changes, but the essence of the reforms is the following. 
In April 1999, the levels of weekly earnings at which employers start paying national 
insurance contributions were aligned with the weekly level of the income tax personal 
allowance; and a “kink” was removed from the employee and employer national 
insurance contribution schedule. In April 2000, the earnings threshold for employee 
national insurance contributions was increased slightly. The taxation changes involved 
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the introduction of a 10 percent tax rate in April 1999 (though this was unlikely to have 
affected those working sufficient hours to be eligible for the tax credit, it could 
nonetheless have induced an increase in labor supply among low-skill workers in the 
control group); and a reduction in the next lowest marginal tax rate from 23 percent to 22 
percent in April 2000. 
In the same manner as for the minimum wage, we can see whether that the 
foregoing results were driven by the tax and national insurance changes by restricting the 
sample to a single tax year. Since survey responses from the 1998-99 tax year have 
already been removed from the sample, this merely involves excluding surveys taken 
after 6 April 2000. The restricted sample, purged of possible minimum wage, national 
insurance, and taxation effects, is a “before” period of June to August 1999, and an 
“after” period of December 1999 to 5 April 2000.13  
Unfortunately, because earnings and health questions are only asked in the first 
and last quarters of the survey, this means that we can no longer explore the effect of the 
tax credit changes on wages or health status. In addition, because the results rely on 
within-person variation, removing some of the surveys restricts the number of degrees of 
freedom in the model, which should, ceteris paribus, reduce the precision of the 
estimates.  
Table 6 presents the results of this specification, for the first specification 
(comparing prime-age adults with children to prime-age adults without children). Here, 
the coefficient on being employed ceases to be significant (though remains positive), 
while the coefficients on total weekly hours, working 16 hours or more, and working 30 
hours or more, all remain positive and significant.  
                                                 
13 However, it is important to note that if the minimum wage, national insurance, or income taxation 
changes were caused significant anticipation effects or lagged effects, they might nonetheless still affect 
this restricted sample. 
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 Table 6: Restricted Sample 
Treatment group: Adults with children 
Control group: Adults without children 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Employed Total weekly 
hours 
>16 hours >30 hours 
Treat*After 0.005 1.438*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 
 [0.005] [0.540] [0.013] [0.013] 
After  -0.006* -0.008 0.020** -0.009 
 [0.004] [0.381] [0.009] [0.010] 
Indiv. FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 18893 14322 14322 14322 
R2 0.93 0.63 0.75 0.81 
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors, 
clustered at the individual level, in parentheses.  “Treat” denotes individuals in the treatment group, while 
“After” denotes observations after October 1999. Sample is restricted to the period from June 1, 1999 to 
April 5, 2000. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion
Using a variety of treatment-control pairings, and relying only on within-
individual variation, the 1999 tax credit reforms appear to have had a positive impact on 
labor force participation, and on hours worked. Comparing parents with childless adults, 
the policy led to a 1 percentage point boost in labor force participation, and a 1.1 hour 
increase in the working week for those already in the labor force. Hours increased across 
the distribution, with no evidence of bunching at the 16-hour and 30-hour thresholds. 
Across family types, the tax credit appeared to have increased hours worked for eligible 
single women, as well as for both men and women in couples. The positive hours effect is 
robust to purging the sample of the possible effect of the UK minimum wage, tax 
changes, and national insurance contribution changes. The policy also boosted pre-tax 
earnings by 4 percent (though it did not have a statistically significant impact on post-tax 
earnings), and may even have reduced the fraction of people who said that they had a 
serious health problem, or that a health problem prevented them from working. 
How do these estimates compare to those in other papers to have evaluated the 
1999 reforms? Recall that Brewer et al (2003) estimated a structural model of 
individuals’ preferences, and found that the October 1999 reform should have boosted the 
employment of single mothers by 3.4 percentage points, but reduced the employment of 
men and women in couples by 0.4 percentage point. By contrast, I find little evidence of 
heterogeneity across family types. Given the different data sources (Brewer et al use the 
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Family Resources Survey) and the fact that the present paper uses a natural experiment 
approach, it is probably not surprising that the results presented here differ somewhat.  
In the case of single mothers, the results in this paper are also smaller than the two 
natural experiment studies that focused on this group alone. Gregg and Harkness (2003) 
found that reforms to the tax credit brought about a 5 percentage point increase in single 
mothers’ employment rates over the period 1998-2002, while Francesconi and Van der 
Klaauw (2004) found that tax credit reforms over the period 1991-2001 led to a 5.5 
percentage point increase in the labor force participation rate for single mothers, with 
most of the effect occurring in 1999. Although it is difficult to compare studies using 
different data sources and measuring effects over different time horizons, one possibility 
way of reconciling the evidence is that there was some degree of anticipation of the 
reforms in the pre-period. 
What can the effects observed in this paper tell us about how the poor respond to 
changing economic incentives? One factor to note is that despite the fact that both 
welfare and the tax credit were boosted in October 1999, the reform nonetheless had a 
positive effect on labor supply. While theory suggests that the difference between welfare 
and in-work benefits will be a key factor determining the employment effect, the stigma 
associated with welfare may be such that a comparable increase in both welfare and the 
tax credit will nonetheless induce a rise in labor supply.  
Another important feature to note about the 1999 tax credit increase is the finding 
that average hours for those already in the labor force increased. As Dilnot and McCrae 
(1999, 15) observed before the reform took effect, “The apparently common-sense 
assumption that lowering tapers must be good is far from obviously true; it may be better 
to have higher taper rates affecting a smaller group.” My results show that the combined 
effect of a lower taper rate and a more generous maximum credit was to boost hours for 
those already in employment. Since theory unambiguously predicts that a more generous 
maximum credit amount should reduce hours for those in employment, it seems likely 
that the increase in hours can be ascribed to the lower taper rate. This suggests that 
lowering the taper rate was indeed a sensible reform, despite the fact that more people 
now found themselves in the phase-out range. For those designing tax credits in other 
countries, lower phase-out rates should be preferred. 
Lastly, a more general point is in order. The UK tax credit is different in many 
respects to the US EITC. Yet both nonetheless appear to have had a positive impact on 
labor supply. Carefully designing tax credit programs is important, but it is useful to see 
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that positive employment effects can flow from programs that are structurally quite 
different from one another. 
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Appendix 1: Specification Checks 
 
The empirical findings presented in this paper are based on individual fixed 
effects regressions. Here, I compare these findings with two alternative specifications: a 
simple differences-in-differences estimate, and an estimate in which I calculate a matched 
propensity score for the treatment and control groups, and then calculate the differences-
in-differences estimate by weighting each observation by the inverse of its propensity 
score. Both are calculated for the sample including all adults, and the propensity score is 
calculated using local linear regression matching, with the variables included in the probit 
model being gender, age, years of education, race (four categories), and a dummy for 
single/non-single. 
Appendix Table 1 presents three sets of results – the individual fixed effects 
specification shown in Table 2 (reproduced here for ease of comparability), a differences-
in-differences estimate, and a matched differences-in-differences estimate. Note that in 
the absence of attrition from the panel, the estimates in Panels A and B should be 
identical. However, with 3.3 percent of respondents failing to answer the survey in one or 
more quarters, it is possible that these two estimation methods may have diverged. 
The results from Panels A, B and C produce similar results for total hours and 
earnings, but the positive effect on employment does not recur in either of the 
differences-in-differences specification. A positive effect on working more than 30 hours 
is found in the individual fixed effects and matched differences-in-differences 
specifications, but not in the simple differences-in-differences specification; while the 
positive effect on working more than 16 hours is found only in the matched differences-
in-differences specification. Unlike the individual fixed effects specification, the two 
differences-in-differences specifications also do not suggest any significant difference on 
the health reporting outcomes.  
Which set of results should be preferred? The advantage of the individual fixed 
effects specification over differences-in-differences is that it is possible to distinguish 
between changes that are due to compositional effects and changes that are due to 
individuals changing their behavior. For example, the findings in column 1 show that 
persons in the treatment group were more likely to begin working than those in the 
control group (Panel A), but the average change in the employment rate of the two groups 
was statistically indistinguishable (Panels B and C). Together, these findings indicate that 
the attrition rate of employed (non-employed) persons from the treatment group (control 
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group) was higher than from the control group. While it is possible that this attrition was 
non-random, to the extent that it was related to observable characteristics in the attritors, 
it will be captured by the longitudinal weights. For this reason, the paper focuses on the 
individual fixed effects specification. 
 
Appendix Table 1: Full sample 
Treatment group: Parents 
Control group: Childless adults 
Panel A: Regression with individual fixed effects (same as Table 2)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Employed Total 
weekly 
hours 
>16 
hours 
>30 
hours 
Log  
(pre-tax 
earnings) 
Log 
(post-tax 
earnings) 
Health 
problem 
Limiting 
health 
problem 
Treat*After 0.009* 1.284*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.046*** 0.033*** -0.006 -0.007 
 [0.005] [0.387] [0.009] [0.010] [0.012] [0.011] [0.005] [0.006] 
After  -0.008** -1.266*** -0.008 -0.028*** 0.004 0.01 0.009** 0.017*** 
 [0.003] [0.270] [0.006] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004] 
Indiv. FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 31600 23874 23874 23874 10247 10247 31600 31600 
R2 0.90 0.57 0.69 0.74 0.95 0.95 0.87 0.86 
Panel B: Differences-in-differences estimate
DD estimate -0.005 1.015*** -0.004 0.0002 0.027*** 0.016** 0.003 0.005 
 [0.004] 0.197 [0.003] [0.004] [0.009] [0.008] [0.004] [0.004] 
Panel C: Matched differences-in-differences estimate
DD estimate -0.004 1.525*** 0.041*** 0.032*** 0.018** 0.010 -0.004 -0.002 
 [0.005] [0.196] [0.004] [0.005] [0.009] [0.008] [0.004] [0.005] 
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors, 
clustered at the individual level, in parentheses. Specifications including work hours are restricted to those 
in employment. Earnings are combined weekly earnings from main job and any secondary job. Post-tax 
earnings take into account income taxes and tax credits. In Panel A, “Treat” denotes individuals in the 
treatment group, while “After” denotes observations after October 1999. 
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